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COMMENTS
THE PATCO DISPUTE-A NEED FOR CHANGE IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE LABOR SETTLEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
During the period of March 25, 1970 to April 14, 1970 air travel in the
United States was crippled by a labor dispute between the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Or-
ganization (PATCO). The work stoppage caused inconvenience in
travel and resultant pecuniary losses to airline companies flying in the
United States.' Particularly significant in the dispute was the fact that
controllers, as civil service employees of the United States, have never been
given the right to strike. Hence, strike conduct exercised on their part
subjects them to possible loss of employment and criminal prosecution.2
The purpose of this comment, is to examine in detail the labor dispute
between the FAA and PATCO members which occurred in early 1970,
and thus to illustrate the dangerous results of public sector labor-manage-
ment neglect in the field of American aviation. This illustration coupled
with a few words about public employees at the conclusion of the com-
ment hopefully shall show the need for reform which, when reaching ma-
turity, will enable further aviation growth without continued employee dis-
satisfaction.
THE FAA
As a necessary part in the continual development of aviation, the air
traffic control function was born, nurtured and concommitantly expanded.
From its inception in the United States as an airport area control device,
it has blossomed into a highly sophisticated nationwide control system.
In the 1930's, when relatively large scale commercial aviation began,
the major airlines experienced severe airport area congestion. To allievate
these conditions Trans World Airlines, American Airlines, Eastern Air-
1. The Airline Transportation Association, the association of the Airlines In-
dustry, claimed $100,000,000 in damages resulting from the PATCO "sick-out."
See PATCO Newsletter, Sept. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
2. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1918 (1966).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
lines and United Airlines created and funded the "Air Traffic Control
Corporation."'3  Later, in 1936, the government acquired the corporation
and placed it under the auspices of the Department of Commerce. 4 There
it suffered from a lack of organization, an absence of leadership and an
insufficiency of funds.
Today, via the Department of Transportation Act5 incorporating the
farsighted 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act 6 and the 1958 Federal Aviation
Act, 7 responsibility for management of the air traffic control function is
placed clearly on the FAA. In this regard the Department of Transporta-
tion Act provided in part that
[t]he Administrator is authorized and directed to develop plans for and formulate
policy with respect to the use of the navigable air-space; and assign . . . or order
the use of navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he
may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient
utilization of such airspace. . . . The Administrator is authorized, within the limits
of available appropriations made by Congress, (1) to acquire, establish, and improve
air-navigation facilities wherever necessary; (2) to operate and maintain such air-
navigation facilities; (3) to arrange for publication of aeronautical maps and
charts necessary for the safe and efficient movement of aircraft in air navigation...
and (4) to provide necessary facilities and personnel for the regulation and protec-
tion of air traffic. . . . The Administrator is further authorized and directed to
prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of aircraft, for the
navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft . . . including rules for the pre-
vention of collisions between aircraft.8
Thus, according to this Act, the Administrator of the FAA has the duty of
planning and administering rules and regulations for the safe and efficient
use of airspace through the operation and maintenance of control facilities.
To effectuate these goals the FAA requires tests for airmen and air-
craft and provides guidance for airport planning.9 As a part of this con-
trol, it provides systems of navigation aids (navaids) installed, operated
and maintained by the Administration's own personnel. The directives
for the implementation of FAA safety regulations emanate from eighteen
area managers who have their regional headquarters in New York, At-
3. See Winn & Douglas, Air Traffic Control: Hidden Danger in the Clear
Blue Skies, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 255, 256 (1968).
4. Id.
5. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (1966).
6. Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, Tit. I, § 1, 52 Stat. 973.
7. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (1958).
8. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (1958).
9. See the pamphlet published by the FAA entitled: FAA-WHAT IT IS-
WHAT IT DoEs ( ).
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lanta, Kansas City, Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Anchorage and Honolulu
and from the FAA's National Headquarters in Washington D.C.10
FAA headquarters, noting the increase in air traffic, has recently rein-
stated personnel training at the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Center. This
training, it is hoped, will help to achieve the goal of an even safer system
of air traffic control. As a result of training programs such as this, the
FAA has developed its most valued possession-trained personnel. Of
the 43,000 men working for the FAA almost 40 per cent work on the
control of air traffic."
FAA SYSTEMS AND THE CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC
The need for strict control to insure safe and efficient flight operations
can be seen when it is realized that the thousands of aircraft in the air
at any given moment, ranging from supersonic military jets to small pri-
vate airplanes, are concentrated around cities and along the 175,000
miles of aerial highways. 12 The responsibility to maintain these clear air-
ways falls on the air traffic controllers. The job is a demanding one in
that "on the average, throughout the air traffic control system, an aircraft
takes off or lands every second, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a
year."13
These landings and take-offs are operated under one of the two FAA
flight rules. V.F.R., "see and be seen," visual flight rules, impose a great
duty on the pilot; I.F.R., instrument flight rules, requiring the use of ex-
tensive ground equipment, impose a great responsibility on the air traffic
controller whether he works in the Airport Traffic Control Tower, Air
Route Traffic Control Center or Flight Service Station.
The Airport Traffic Control Towers operated by the FAA render an
information and guidance service. In high density traffic centers, these
towers operate twenty-four hours a day. The tower service begins when
the pilot calls in from fifteen to twenty miles away if under V.F.R. and if
under I.F.R., when the center transfers him to the tower. 14 After the
tower controller establishes contact with the aicraft, he provides the pilot
with landing information including altimeter settings and wind vectors.




13. See the pamphlet published by the FAA entitled: IN THESE HANDS (1966).
14. Id.
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follow "in," and any taxiing information required. 15 Separation during
the landing sequence is accomplished by aircraft routing and rerouting
procedures thus insuring the maintenance of separate altitude and ap-
proach speeds for each aircraft.
Pilot to tower communication is accomplished by the extensive use of
radio equipment. Other necessary information concerning the aircraft is
passed to the tower by telephone and radar installations capable of deter-
mining the identity and direction of flying aircraft.16
Air Route Traffic Control Centers are also operated by the FAA.
When the aircraft moves beyond the range of the smaller airport area
radar installations, it then becomes the responsibility of other FAA con-
trollers stationed in the twenty-one air route traffic control centers to
monitor and guide the pilot along the airways. These twenty-one centers
divide the sky into twenty-one irregularly shaped areas, each of which is
under the supervision of the center in that area. The function of the cen-
ters is to insure that safety regulations regarding separation of inflight
I.F.R. aircraft are followed. 17 Their function is carried out by the use of
prescribed distance and time separations for aircraft, thus providing each
aircraft with a block of moving airspace of its own.
As the aircraft moves through the area assigned to the center, the pilot
reports to the controller both his present position and an estimated time of
arrival over the next reference point. It is the responsibility of this con-
troller to maintain a flight progress slip on the aircraft while it is in his
sector-a journey of as much as five-hundred miles.' 8  Communication
and control is maintained with the pilot via voice radio until the aircraft
is from twenty to thirty miles from its destination whereupon the aircraft
is transferred to airport area control.' 9 This airport control may either
be the tower, or, where high density I.F.R. flights are found, a special
approach control installation. The importance of these centers can only
be gauged by the volume of aircraft they handle. Each year the centers
control more than twelve million aircraft. 20
The FAA offers other services through its Flight Service Stations. Be-
sides inflight guidance the FAA maintains three-hundred flight service
15. Id.
16. Id. These installations are capable of making the determinations mentioned







stations, each of which cover an area with a radius from one-hundred
to two-hundred miles. Specialists at the station, virtual experts on area
weather, airports and flight planning, provide valuable pre-flight and in-
flight data to the pilot. 21 More than 300,000 non-airline pilots constituting
ninety-five per cent of all active civil pilots can make use of these services. 22
Connecting the entire network of FAA installations are 950,000 miles
of communication lines.23 This extensive system insures the rapid and
accurate dissemination of all aircraft information. Thus it facilitates the
continued smooth and efficient maintainance of all areas involved in air-
flight control and operation.
While the achievements of the FAA to date are truly impressive, its
goals are even more laudable, for in a FAA publication it has been stated:
Together, man and equipment epitomize the goal of the Federal Aviation [Admin-
istration]-to achieve the highest degree of safety in the air, as well as to maintain
world leadership for the United States in the field of civil aviation.24
Unfortunately, not everyone in the system feels that these great aspirations
and goals are being fulfilled, or at least approached, in the proper manner.
These great dissenters are the air traffic controllers themselves.
THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
There are approximately ten thousand air traffic controllers on a non-
supervisory level working with microphones and radar equipment.2 5
Ninety per cent of these controllers are between the ages of twenty-eight
and forty years old; the average age of the tower controllers is thirty-four
and the average age of control center controllers is thirty-seven. 26 The
youth of these controllers is not accidental. As the controller approaches
fifty years of age he experiences vocational "bum out," a form of ex-
haustion, which is manifested in a decline in quantity and quality of work
production.27
21. Id. The service makes maps, charts and reports available to the pilot and
thus helps him choose a safe and efficient air route.
22. id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The achievement of these goals to date is evidenced by the ever de-
creasing aircraft-accident ratio in both commercial and private aviation. See
Miller, State of the Act in Air Safety, 34 J. OF ArR L. & COM. 343 (1968).
25. Besides the approximately 10,000 air traffic controllers working at the FAA
facilities there are between 4,000 and 5,000 men working on the developmental as-
pects of Air Traffic Control. Interview with Richard Shaftic, Chairman of PATCO
Chicago-O'Hare Tower Branch, in Chicago, March 13, 1971.
26. See PATCO Newsletter, April 11, 1969, at 58, col. 2.
27. When the controller passes forty years of age, his performance deteriorates
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THE TRAINING OF AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
The controller is a civil service employee. He starts at a salary range
between $6,938 and $10,470 per year depending on the extent of his
experience. 28  His first six months are spent as a GS-6 (Government
Service Pay Rating). The first five weeks of training consist of in class-
room preparation in the academic phases of Air Traffic Control including
the study of the various procedures and functions of facilities found in
the overall system. The last portion of his first half year of training is
spent in familiarization of "his" installation-its geography, weather, and
operational procedures.
From the seventh to the eighteenth month the trainee, now a GS-8,
performs a communication function. He transmits aircraft clearance,
flight plans, departure times, and other routine information between tow-
ers and center installations. After eighteen months, and generally to his
thirtieth month, now a GS-10, he is trained in radio contact with aircraft
on the ground. During this period he begins twelve months of "on the
job training."
In the period between thirty and forty-two months after being hired,
the trainee, now a GS-11 is considered qualified to control the pilot
through the taxiing phase of takeoff whereupon he is schooled in trans-
ferring the aircraft to local radar control. In the final six months of this
period, although unable to communicate with airborne aircraft, the quali-
fied trainee may serve as an Associate Radar Controller working as an
assistant to Radar Controllers. If the trainee proves himself capable, he
becomes a fully qualified GS-12 Radar Controller at the end of this
period.29  This intensive program of study and work experience prepares
the candidate to assume his role as a functionary air traffic controller at
the facility for which he was recruited. Significantly, the period of training
lasts three and one-half years.
As a GS-12, the journeyman controller could earn between $15,040
rapidly and by his mid-fifties he is "burned-out." The controller loses his confidence
and what used to take him five seconds now takes him twenty. PATCO News-
letter, id. at 59, col. 1.
28. See U.S. Civil Service Commission, Announcement No. 418, Careers As
Air Traffic Control Specialists (1968). See also infra note 30.
29. See McIntyre, Situation Critical, PATCO JOURNAL, May-June 1968, at 15.
Although generally a correct restatement of the process of training; Richard Shaftic
feels the training period usually ends up being somewhat shorter. Interview with




and $19,549 per year for a forty hour week.30 If employed in high
density locations (those handling a million or more traffic movements)
the controller is eligible to reach GS-13 status which encompasses a
$17,761 to $23,089 per year range.31
THE QUALITIES OF AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
Besides the training which the FAA requires the controller candidate
to have, it demands the ability:
[1] [to] speak rapidly, clearly, and distinctly;
[2] [to] adjust quickly to different assignments, changing conditions, and work-
load fluctuations;
[3] [to] arrive quickly at well-reasoned solutions to complex problems;
[4] [to] remain calm and controlled during and after long periods of tension and
fatigue;
[5] [to have] the judgment to select and take the safest and most effective course
of action from among several available choices;
[6] [to] act decisively under stressful situations and to maintain alertness over
sustained periods of pressure.3 2
The abilities required reflect the need for good judgment in selecting the
safest alternative to dangerous and complex aerial problems.
These qualities have been recognized and noted by a recent Depart-
ment of Transportation Committee looking into the Air Traffic Controller
career.83 It stated in part:
The Committee is impressed with the fact that air traffic controllers constitute a
unique professional group within the Federal establishment. While many other
categories of employees must possess some of the talents, and while many other
jobs impose some of the exacting responsibilities, few combine as many demands
upon the individual as does the job of controller.
The successful controller appears to require-at least-the following special talents
and aptitudes:
30. United States Government Schedule of Annual Salary Rates by Grade,
Jan. 10, 1971.
31. See PATCO Newsletter, April 11, 1969, at 58, col. 2. Salary rates docu-
mented here represent current increases. The million movement high density figure
quoted here represents ATC Centers high density requirements; for ATC Towers
the figure is 350,000 operations. Interview with Richard Shaftic, Chairman of
PATCO Chicago-O'Hare Tower Branch, in Chicago, Mar. 13, 1971.
32. U.S. Civil Service Commission, Announcement No. 418, supra note 28, at 2, 3.
One through four are demanded of center controllers, five and six are required of
tower controllers.
33. This Committee was the Corson Committee, comprised of eight members,
appointed on August 8, 1969 by Secretary of Transportation Volpe. The Com-
mittee filed its report, "Air Traffic Controller Committee Report" on Jan. 29, 1970.
See Government Employee Relation Report, No. 370, Oct. 12, 1970, at G-3 n.4.
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-A highly developed capacity for spatial perception,
-A keenly developed, quick and retentive memory,
-A capacity for articulate and decisive voice communication,
-A capacity for rapid decision making, combined with mature judgment.3 4
After noting the abilities and qualities of these men, it is no great wonder
that on the average they test in the superior range.33 They are indeed
a most important part of the aviation control system.
THE FAA-CONTROLLER DISPUTE
THE FACTORS PRECIPITATING THE UNIONIZATION OF CONTROLLERS
The air traffic controllers are not happy or satisfied, however, with the
system within which they work. They cite many inadequacies within the
system impairing the safety of the flying public.3 6
The controllers claim they are grossly understaffed and independent
statistics seem to verify their charges. In 1963 there was a "freeze" put
on training new controllers. During this period, due to the virtual doubling
of air traffic, controllers had to handle almost twice the old traffic volume
with the same force.37 This freeze was due primarily to the massive ex-
penditure cutback initiated by President Johnson which had a devastating
impact on the FAA. In 1967, for example, the Transportation Depart-
ment asked the White House for a budget for somewhere between a mini-
mum of $25 million and a maximum of $135 million; they were given
$7 million.38 This type of problem was felt throughout the system. Chi-
cago Tower, for example, in 1965 was allocated seventy-five fully quali-
fied controllers but had only forty-four qualified controllers employed;
the personnel eventually increased to eighty but, for a time during the
34. Executive Summary of the Report of the Air Traffic Controller Career
Committee, The Career of the Air Traffic Controller-A Course of Action, Jan.,
1970, at 2.
35. Dr. W. Sands, in a paper submitted to the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, found the controller's intelligence was at a level equivalent with that of
doctors, lawyers, writers and senators. See PATCO Newsletter, Dec. 3, 1969, at 1.
36. Controllers claim that dangers exist when ill controllers are used; when con-
trollers are required to man more than one position while helping trainees; when
controllers are required to work at scopes for longer than a six hour sitting; when
less than minimum separations for aircraft is used; and when controllers are re-
quired to use substandard equipment. See The Safety Committee Report of the
PATCO Miami Convention, May 26, 1969, at 2.
37. PATCO Newsletter, supra note 26, at 59, col. I.
38. See Human Problems in Air Traffic Control (Part I1), 86 AvIATION WEEK
AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY 100 (1967).
year thirty-two controllers were employed.39 In the whole of the Los
Angeles System in September of 1964, 296 men were employed and in
September of 1966 this figure decreased to 285 while the number of oper-
ations grew from 39,626 to 56,594 in that same time period.40
This growth in air traffic worsened the effect in the loss of personnel.
Our country has experienced great growth in air traffic during the last
two decades making greater demands on controllers whose numbers are
not growing as fast. It has been estimated that enplaned passengers will
grow from 69.5 million in 1965 to 370.6 million in 1980. This is a 433
per cent increase. 41 It has been stated that
in five years from 1962 to 1967 general aviation flying increased 40% causing a 75%
increase in A.T.C. workloads. If this trend continues, by 1977 the pressure on A.T.C.
will be 450% greater than it is today. 42
Clearly, this system employing fewer men who are being forced to handle
a greater workload can not function adequately for long. Controllers
have been hard pressed and to the question of how have they done it, a
typical answer has been, "[w] e did it by cutting lots of corners and staying
on this ragged edge of minimums."' 43 Controllers imply that minimum
landing and take-off procedures have been followed, and often violated;
and, in times of great congestion, three mile limits have been shortened
and planes have been cleared for landing before aircraft on the runway
have taken off.44
The FAA is not oblivious to this problem. Jerry Biron, their head of
the manpower section in 1969, has said that the situation can be blamed
on everyone's underestimation of the growth of aviation.45
This underestimation has hampered intelligent planning for an ade-
quate system. Forecasting problems have been common in aviation sys-
tems since shortly after World War I1.46
Although limited by money and training facilities, the FAA has been
39. Interview with Richard Shaftic, Chairman of PATCO Chicago-O'Hare Tower
Branch, in Chicago, Sept. 16, 1970.
40. See New York Times, Mar. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
41. See McIntyre, supra note 29.
42. Supra note 3, at 258 n. 11.
43. PATCO Newsletter, April 11, 1969, at 59, col. 1.
44. Id. at 59, col. 2.
45. Id. at 59, col. 3.
46. In 1948 Civil Aeronautics Agency predicted that by 1955 Americans
would fly 9 to 11.5 billion passenger miles; this projection was revised in 1951 to
20 billion by 1960. By 1955 it was already over the billion mark. See Stayer,
Air Traffic Problem Goes Before the President, 64 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECHNOLOGY 26, 27 (1956).
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making efforts to provide more men to fill controller ranks. These ef-
forts are a start, but the controllers feel that this very important aspect
of the vocation is being grossly mismanaged. Presently, trainees are sent
to the education center at Oklahoma City where they are taught techniques
on recognition and radar familiarization. Later they are sent to different
areas of the United States where they are engaged in an "on the job
training" type of program. Journeyman controllers feel that this is a dan-
gerous practice. One controller voiced a common complaint in stating
that "these trainees are assigned a veteran controller who keeps an eye on
them but at peak periods, when everyone is busy and he really needs you,
how can you help?"' 47 On March 4, 1969 one such incident involved a
Plinair Heron which crashed with nineteen aboard into a mountain near
San Juan.48  It was being monitored by a trainee who vectored it on a
low altitude into the mountain-side while his instructor was busy doing
his own job as a coordinator.
Controllers feel that each inexperienced, new man assigned to an in-
stallation is a double liability. The trainee has difficulty in doing his own
job and also cuts into the efficiency of the rest of the crew because of the
amount of time and help experienced controllers must devote to him.
Controllers seek to radically change this system by instituting training
procedures similar to those demanded of trainee pilots. They suggest ex-
tensive use of simulation for instructional purposes; video tapes of con-
troller situations which can be used in conjunction with classroom discus-
sion offered at public institutions or ATC facilities are proposed. 49
Controllers suggest adoption of extensive medical and psychological
testing procedures in addition to a more honest approach in recruiting new
men into the service. 50 In this way, they hope to combat the attrition
rate of approximately sixty per cent which have been experiencing. 1
The controllers also feel that a gradual promotion up to high density
areas like New York and Chicago, where new controllers are "in over their
heads" and consequently leave the service, might cut down the wash out
rate.52 Based on a man's performance and ability, he would be qualified
to move up to higher traffic demands and salary benefits as he obtained
47. Shaftic, supra note 39.
48. See PATCO Newsletter, Mar. 21, 1969, at 54.
49. See PATCO-Chicago Terminal Area Branch, Recommendations to the
Corson Committee at 1, 2, 3.
50. Shaftic, supra note 39.
51. Shaftic, supra note 39.
52. Shaftic, supra note 39.
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experience; correspondingly, older controllers, those in their early forties,
would be gradually phased down to the less demanding jobs in lighter
traffic areas.
Dr. W. W. Sands, in May of 1970, in his study on controllers found
that
many psychosomatic complaints ... mental lapses (losing the picture), were a
common and fearful part of the controller's job .... Anxiety states, depression
and marital difficulties were abundant. Men involved in accidents or near misses
exhibited severe emotional disturbance and maladjustment. In general, the symptoms
closely resembled the type of fatigue found in combat military personnel. 53
Controllers hope that their suggested job mobility procedures would help
to combat medical disorders related to the vocational stress described in
the Sands' Report by placing a man according to his ability to do the job
and ability to weather the strain.
These demands on the controller, both physical and emotional, tend
to contribute to the deterioration of the controller's performance which
occurs normally in his early fifties; consequently, in order to protect
them in these later years, controllers are advocating twenty year retire-
ment annuity benefits as are accorded to other government employees
working in high stress vocations. 54  These benefits, through government
and employee contribution, would assure retirement protection, make the
job more attractive, and promote controller morale.
In order to help high density traffic areas, where controller shortages
are the most acute, controllers desire higher pay for higher density control.
They also advocate that five years of high density control be a considera-
tion in promotion to supervisory advancement. 55
All the conditions presently existing, contollers feel, contribute to a
system racked with danger. Former FAA Administrator, W. F. McKee,
recognizes that dangers exist and has stated that "statements have been
made . . . that a high level of safety can be maintained with current
FAA funding levels. . . . This is simply not so."'  Clearly, increases in
funds for hiring controllers and modernizing safety equipment must be
made to keep up with the greater demands of increased aircraft volume
and development if safety standards are to be maintained. In 1968,
53. Summary of Paper to be Submitted for Presentation to the American Psy-
chiatric Association, May 1970, Emotional Disorders in O'Hare Aircraft Controllers,
October 1969, PATCO JouRNAL, October, 1969, at 40.
54. See PATCO Message For The New Year, Jan. 1970, at 3, col. 2.
55. See PATCO Chicago Terminal Area Branch, Recommendation To The Cor-
son Committee, at 6.
56. PATCO Newsletter, May 16, 1969 at 74.
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FAA investigative teams looked into mid-air near misses. The teams
found 2,239 near misses but indicated that when unreported cases were
added the number would be four times that high. 57  Thus, these results
fully demonstrate the urgency of the problem.
The FAA is aware of the problems and the dangers that the controllers
cite. To help overburdened controllers the FAA has authorized the hir-
ing of 2,400 new controllers per year for the period between 1969 and
1973.58 Further, FAA planning documents call for a $2,000,000,000
expenditure in the next ten years to combat obsolete facilities and equip-
ment shortages. 59 While these plans are a start, the need for higher fund-
ing levels is the major obstacle to the system's modernization. Estimates
on revamping the system just so it works adequately for the present, with-
out regard to tomorrow's problems, run as high as $100,000,000.60
The friction between the controllers and the FAA, caused by the lack
of substantial appropriations, has lead a committee (The Corson Commit-
tee), appointed in 1969 by Transportation Secretary Volpe to study the
controller problem, to publish these findings:
[1] extreme staffing shortages exist especially at those facilities controlling the
bulk of air traffic;
[2] inadequacy of control equipment caused by the lack of funds;
[3] poor training techniques;
[4] inadequate recruiting practices
[5] leading to a conclusion that demoralization and unrest are apparent among
a substantial number of controllers.61
The Corson Committee findings, verifying controller complaints about
equipment and training and recruitment technique yielding staffing short-
ages, highlighted the dissatisfaction among controllers and set it before the
FAA. This dissatisfaction, the committee found, has been aggravated in
part by poor managerial techniques. It recommended that the FAA "re-
evaluate and revise existing communications policies and procedures in
order to build a more effective interchange between F.A.A. management
57. See Kohler, The Great Deception, PATCO JOURNAL, October 1969 at 6, 7.
The FAA in 1968 granted controllers immunity from reprisals for near misses if
controllers reported them. See PATCO Newsletter, Jan. 14, 1969, at 32. This
program has been extended through December 31, 1971. See PATCO Newsletter,
Dec. 14, 1969 at 2.
58. See Wilson, Faced with Deepening ATC Needs, FAA Academy Takes It
Back, PATCO JOURNAL, June 1969, at 24.
59. See PATCO Newsletter, May 8, 1969 at 68.
60. See supra note 3, at 290.
61. See PATCO Newsletter, Feb. 13, 1970, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 1.
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and employees."'6 2 Clearly, its recommendations indicated that the con-
troller and the FAA were not communicating-a major technique of em-
ployer-employee orderly problem-solving was not available to either side.
The total lack of communication and the problems inherent in the job
have encouraged controllers to organize. Controllers have joined three
labor organization: 1) the National Association of Government Em-
ployees (NAGE) which represents many different types of government
workers; 2) the Air Traffic Controller Association (ATCA), headed by
retired chiefs of the FAA Air Traffic Service and composed of military
and civilian controllers, many of whom are supervisory personnel; and
3) PATCO.
THE PATCO EFFORT TO ORGANIZE CONTROLLERS
PATCO has been the most militant of the three. It has criticized
NAGE for its representation of nonprofessionals and ATCA for its close
association with the FAA. PATCO was formed on January 11, 1968
in New York. The organizers, noting the anonymity of the controller,
sought to make the organization nationally known by securing "name per-
sonalities." F. Lee Bailey served as the first Acting Executive Director
until April of 1970.63 Since PATCO's inception, it has also secured
Arthur Godfrey, Paul Burke, Arnold Palmer, Bill Lear, Susan Oliver,
Herb Orlowitz, and Johnny Carson as its trustees.6 4
PATCO's efforts initially were directed toward organizing non-super-
visory controllers in terminals and centers; to them it granted full mem-
bership. Supervisory controllers were eligible for associate membership,
lacking the right of organization, management and decision making.
Gradually, it became apparent that the attempts by PATCO to organize
the controller were unsuccessful. 65  Verification of this could be seen in
the negative recognitional response to the Corson Report:
No authoritative data as to the membership strength of each of these organizations
is available. But the secondary data available to the committee and the impres-
62. PATCO Newsletter, Feb. 10, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
63. See Government Employees Relation Report No. 355, June 29, 1970, at A-8.
Bailey's tenure has not been continuous since PATCO's inception. See Our New
Executive Director, PATCO JOURNAL, September-October 1968, at 4.
64. See PATCO JoURNAL, October 1969, at 2. See also PATCO JOURNAL,
May-June 1969, at 2.
65. PATCO with 200 members in February 1968 grew to 6,250 by March 1969.
See PATCO Newsletter, April 11, 1969, at 59, col. 1. By June 1969 PATCO had
7,100 members. See PATCO Newsletter, August 13, 1969 at 1.
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sions formed in the course of extensive field visits, have lead to the conclusion
that P.A.T.C.O. probably represents a majority of the center and tower controllers.66
Thus, an FAA committee had, in a way, recognized that PATCO was the
majority representative of controllers. In spite of this fact the FAA
was unwilling to recognize PATCO as the representative of the contollers.
PATCO, therefore, armed with FAA information indicating that NAGE
represented 2,000, ATCA represented 2,150, and it represented 7,100 of
the journeymen controllers, began through the machinery of Executive
Order 11491 to seek national recognition. It also began examining more
closely its rights and obligations as a representative of government em-
ployees. 67
THE ABSENCE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE-THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE
Controllers, since they are federal employees, are governed by Execu-
tive Order 11491, operative January 1, 1970.68 This order provides that
workers are allowed to join labor organizations defined as:
"Labor organization" means a lawful organization of any kind in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
agencies concerning grievances, personnel policies and practices, or other matters
affecting the working conditions of their employees; but does not include an or-
ganization which ... asserts the right to strike against the Government of the
United States or any agency thereof, or to assist or participate in such a strike,
or imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist or participate in such a strike.69
Clearly, under the Order, while membership in a labor organization is
permissible, the organization's activities concerning the right to strike are
prohibited. The Order further states that it shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice on the part of the union to" . . . call or engage in a strike, work stop-
page, or slowdown; picket an agency . . .or condone any such activity
by failing to take affirmative action to prevent or stop it. ' ' 70 This Order
thus gives the right to federal employees to unionize but does not allow
the union to engage in strike activity. The violation of these rules would
subject the organization to the loss of its recognition. Unfair labor practice
charges could also be filed by the government against the union.
Similarly, the right to strike is denied to individuals in federal employ-
ment. The law provides:
66. PATCO Newsletter, Feb. 13, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
67. PATCO Newsletter, Aug. 13, 1969, at 1.
68. Executive Order No. 11491 is, in reality, a modification of Executive Order
No. 10988 instituted by President Kennedy in 1962. The modification added more
"teeth" into its administration..
69. Exec. Order No. 11491, 34 C.F.R. 17605, § 2e (1970).
70. Id. § 19b-4.
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An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United
States or the government of the District of Columbia if he-(l) advocates the
overthrow of our constitutional form of government; (2) is a member of an organi-
zation that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of govern-
ment; (3) participates in a strike or asserts the right to strike, against the Govern-
ment of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or (4) is
a member or an organization of employees of the Government of the United States
or of individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia that he
knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or the
government of the District of Columbia. 71
By this section, the law prohibits any individual who holds a position with
the Government to strike or assert the right to strike. The violation of
this section is made a crime by the following provision:
Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not
accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government
of the District of Columbia if he-(l) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional
form of government; (2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates
the overthrow of our constitutional form of government; (3) participates in a strike,
or asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or the
government of the District of Columbia; or (4) is a member of an organization of
employees of the Government of the United States or of individuals employed by
the government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike
against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of
Columbia; shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year and a day, or both.72
Thus by the foregoing section, the law imposes a possible fine and im-
prisonment for those who engage in strike action against the Government
qua employer.
This punishment extends not only to federal employees who engage in
a strike but also those who urge them to strike. The following section
punishes the latter as if they were principals:
(a) whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, includes or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b)
whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. 73
From the preceding sections it would appear that employees, or others,
either as individuals or as members of a labor organization, neither have
the "right to strike" nor the "right to assert the right to strike" under pen-
alty of law. This, however, is not necessarily the case. A three judge
United States District Court decision rendered in October of 1969, struck
71. 80 Stat. 609, 89-554 (Sept. 6, 1966).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1966).
73. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1948).
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down the federal provision prohibiting the assertion of the right to strike.7 4
The court found that the law was an "unconstitutional restriction on first
amendment rights," and declared that it exercised a "chilling effect" on
guaranteed rights of free speech and petition to Congess.7 5 The court, in
rejecting the government argument that the word "assert" meant only
conduct "designed to incite others to strike," said that the view did not
correspond with the dictionary definition of the word.76
THE EVE OF THE DISPUTE
PATCO soon after its inception found that it would be less than an
easy task to gain, for its members, truly meaningful status as a bargaining
unit. As often happens in labor disputes of this sort, animosities were
building outside of the "real issues". Intolerance was displayed by
both sides. The following list, far from noting all such uncalled for
incidents, was indicative of the breach between labor and management:
(1) FAA refusal to follow regular procedure in not allowing PATCO or-
ganizers leaves of absence to organize the group;77 (2) Bailey's suggestion
to controllers that they refuse to follow plane separation criteria ordered
by supervisors if controllers feel those orders are dangerous; 78 (3) FAA
sponsored psychological tests of Bailey determining "his role in life is to
slay 'Goliaths,' he is cut from the same cloth as Joe McCarthy, Father
Coughlin and Huey Long, he is a man bent on destroying authority where-
ever he found it;' 7 9 (4) controller refusal to take psychological suitability
tests; 0 (5) a statement of the PATCO Board of Directors that "Ad-
ministrator John Shaffer was a detriment to air traffic control and had so
frequently indulged in misrepresentation in the past, that there was no
reasonable possibility that he could ever be a respected or effective
leader;" 8' (6) an FAA determination that PATCO was responsible for
a June eighteenth to twentieth 1969 slowdown and, therefore, would lose
its check-off privileges and that the FAA would no longer recognize
PATCO;8 2 (7) a PATCO decision that they would no longer recognize
74. See Government Employee Relation Report No. 365, Sept. 7, 1970 at A-10.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See PATCO Newsletter, Sept. 10, 1969, at 1.
78. See PATCO Newsletter, Mar. 21, 1969, at 1.
79. New York Times, Sept. 20, 1970, (Magazine) at 34.
80. See PATCO Newsletter, Nov. 18, 1969, at 1.
81. PATCO Bulletin, July 31, 1969, at 3.
82. See PATCO Bulletin, July 31, 1969, at 1.
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the FAA;8 3 and (8) a letter from Bailey to FAA Arministrator Shaffer
suggesting that Shaffer was incompetent and overpaid and that PATCO
may soon start choosing their own supervisors at the facilities.8 4  These
instances including the attacks upon the prominent figures involved did
nothing toward solving the real issue of the dispute-aviation safety-
but, rather, did much toward making solutions infinitely more difficult to
attain.
This was the background-an underpaid and overworked controller
versus an underfunded FAA, both working hard to promote safe, efficient
travel but disagreeing in approach. These disagreements could, when
burdened with interpersonal friction and animosity, erupt into open re-
bellion if a proper catalyst were found. Such a catalyst was provided in
September of 1969 when the FAA sought to transfer James Sparks,
James McCurnin, Perry Taylor and James Henson, four energetic PATCO
organizers, from the Baton Rouge, Louisiana tower.8 5
THE DISPUTE BEGINS
These transfers immediately became the issue upon which the follow-
ing events were based. In a PATCO membership newsletter the organi-
zation stated:
Baton Rouge now looms as the acid test for controller unity over the country.
F.A.A. has sought to use the involuntary transfer as a new major disciplinary de-
vice. . . Again F.A.A. . . . has shown a serious lack of understanding, not only
of controller unity and intestinal fortitude, but of intelligence. Looking at Baton
Rouge, any man in A.T.C. can see that tomorrow it might be him at his facility.
• . . Thus the P.A.T.C.O. Board has given highest priority to the four men at
Baton Rouge. This organization will simply not tolerate that they be transferred/
punished.86
From the tenor of this statement it can readily be seen that PATCO
felt the involuntary transfer was being used unfairly as a disciplinary de-
vice and, in order to stop any further exploitation, all controllers must
organize and resist its use. The FAA's position was that the transfers
were necessitated to correct some operational shortcomings being experi-
enced at the Baton Rouge Air Traffic Control Tower.87 Thus, the FAA's
83. See PATCO Newsletter, Nov. 4, 1969, at 2.
84. Id. at 3.
85. See PATCO Newsletter, Oct. 2, 1969 at 3. One of the four, Perry Taylor,
sought to be transferred to Ft. Smith, Texas, where his father, sick with cancer,
resided. The FAA granted the request and so the fight continued for the remaining
three. See PATCO Newsletter, Nov. 18, 1969, at 6.
86. PATCO Newsletter, Oct. 20, 1969, at 1, 2.
87. See Government Employees Relation Report No. 370, Oct. 12, 1970, at G-2,
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
concluded that it could and would transfer controllers in order to improve
air traffic control service.
Rather than summarily accepting the rationale given for the transfers,
PATCO saw these actions as an attempt to destroy the viability of its or-
ganization. Hence, passive reaction on the part of the controllers could
jeopardize the entire organization and place it in grave danger of being
silenced. The Board of Directors of PATCO, therefore, sent a "strongly
worded letter" addressed to FAA Administrator Shaffer saying that, if
the involuntary transfers were not stopped, a nationwide controller demon-
stration on behalf of the men would be held .... "88 The FAA re-
sponded to PATCO Chairman, Mike Rock: "This will acknowledge re-
ceipt of your latest letters. You can expect individual replies in due
course."' 9 It does appear that the concern of the FAA was but slight and,
as will be shown, almost distastrous in its effect.
In this aura of rising friction, the controllers who had been involunarily
transferred began to pursue an administrative appeal of the FAA order.
On October 28, 1969, an examiner was appointed to resolve the issue.
His conduct of the hearing gave rise to numerous and flagrant violations
of procedural due process, which was to be afforded in this type of po-
ceeding.90
The conduct of the hearing examiner eventually resulted in a suit
brought by counsel for the controller-petitioners to enjoin the proceedings.
A temporary injuction was granted, but the request for a permanent in-
junction was denied. In so doing the federal district court held that it
could not interfere with the FAA hearing and its procedures, until the con-
trollers involved could show requisite "irreparable harm" and "immediate
damage" emanating from the lack of record.9 ' Thus, only an adverse
decision by the hearing examiner could provide a possible basis for in-
junctive relief.
The decision by the examiner was duly postponed on three occasions
from November 12 to November 26 and, finally, to December 8, where
col. 1. PATCO disputes this claim. PATCO presented, at the FAA hearing, rat-
ings for individual controllers at Baton Rouge showing that they ranged from
"qualified" to "outstanding." See PATCO Newsletter, Jan. 19, 1970 at 2.
88. PATCO Newsletter, Oct. 20, 1969 at 1.
89. PATCO Newsletter, Oct. 28, 1969, at 1.
90. See Government Employee Relation Report No. 370, Oct. 12, 1970, at
G-2 col. 1. Among the errors committed by the examiner were: 1) witholding the
names of FAA witnesses to petitioners; 2) examining witnesses in secret; 3) deny-
ing to petitioners the right to cross-examination; and 4) denying petitioners the
right to a record of the proceedings.
91. See PATCO Bulletin, Jan. 19, 1970, at 2.
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-upon that date the transfers were sustained. The decision became final
on January 14, 1970, when the FAA approved the order.92
From January 23 through 25, 1970, the Directors of PATCO were
called into an emergency session to examine what was to be its course
of action in the light of the final order of transfer entered by the FAA.
As a result of that meeting, a telegram was sent to Secretary of Trans-
portation Volpe, which stated that
as of February 15, 1970 all optional air traffic service rendered by our membership
above and beyond those that they are required to perform by their contract and by
regulation will be withdrawn, especially including the services of the many control-
lers who are in a present condition of fatigue and who are medically entitled to a
period of respite for the preservation of their own health. 98
While what PATCO had said correctly declared their rights as employees,
it did, more importantly, imply a threat. Other portions of the statement
made reference to the Baton Rouge situation and proposed talks to air
those grievances, which though not expressed in the message, founded the
basis necessitating its existence. The telegram was answered by FAA
Administrator Shaffer cautioning that concerted action such as withhold-
ing sevices would constitute an illegal strike.9 4  He urged immediate
reconsideration by PATCO of its present position, saying that employees
engaged in such activity are subject to penalty under the laws and standards
of conduct of employees. This matter-of-fact restatement of the law
contained no conciliatory tone of suggestion of compromise.
THE CONTROLLER "SICK-OUT"
Subsequent to these events there began extensive activity on the part
of PATCO officers. F. Lee Bailey spoke to PATCO western leaders
urging them that a "sick-out" demonstration was necessary and in a news
conference on February thirteenth Bailey said he "would anticipate as
one who has talked with controllers from Honolulu to New York that
there would be an impact on the system, and it will occur on Sunday the
15th day of February."9 5 Bailey had made the implication to the world
that there would be a strike.
Prior to the demonstration, however, the FAA and PATCO agreed to
meet on February fifteenth to the seventeenth to discuss the Baton Rouge
situation. The meeting was continued on February twenty-seventh and
on March thirteenth the decision was made to affirm the transfers.
92. Id.
93. Government Employee Relation Report No. 370, Oct. 12, 1970, at G-2 col. 2.
94. See PATCO Bulletin, Feb. 6, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
95. Government Employee Relation Report No. 370, Oct. 12, 1970, at G-3 col. 1.
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Out of these meetings came more PATCO dissatisfaction. They claimed
bad faith on the part of the FAA and the Department of Transportation
negotiators. PATCO Chairman, Mike Rock, claimed the announcement
to transfer "was in direct violation of an express agreement between the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization, the Federal Aviation
Administration, [and] the Department of Transportation . . . [which
was] struck during negotiations" in order to avert the February fifteenth
disruption. 96 PATCO concluded, therefore, that its agreement was pat-
ently breached by the actions of the FAA.
On March twenty-fourth PATCO published a press release reading:
"Airlines, airtravellers, and the flying public are hereby notifed that
swift, severe dissipation of air traffic services will commence throughout
the country at approximately 0800 EST on Wednesday, March 25,
1970."''9 Thus, the warning that there would be some "impact on the
system" was made to both the traveller and the FAA alike. On March
25, 1970, the warning became a reality when instead of the usual ab-
senteeism rate of 4 per cent it was 19.8 per cent. 98
On March 26, 1970, both Bailey and Rock went on a nationally tele-
vised press conference to discuss the demonstration.99 Bailey stated that
the understaffed controllers left at the towers and those inexperienced
trainees pressed into service created a safety problem and, thus, the whole
system should be closed down. In answering a question of a reporter di-
rected to the nature of the controllers actions, Bailey stated that this was
not a strike, but rather, a "walk-out." Thus, he attempted, though futily,
to circumvent the sanctions which could be imposed upon the contollers
because of their actions.
On April 3, 1970, Bailey, after meeting with representatives from the
Justice Department, urged the men back to work but added that since the
problems precipitating the "walk-out" were as yet unresolved, the con-
trollers probably would not return to their jobs. In fact telephone mes-
sages sent to controllers prior to April 3, 1970, told them to ignore Bailey's
"plea."' 00 The prophecy of Bailey was fulfilled, for absenteeism gradu-
ally increased to a high of 30.4 per cent until April 14, 1970, when it re-
turned to normal.' 0 ' The total impact had lasted from March 25, 1970
to April 14, 1970.
96. Id. at G-4 col. 1.
97. Id. at G-4 col. 1.
98. Id. at G-5 col. 1, n. 6.
99. Id. at G-5 col. 2.
100. Id. at G-7 col. 2.
101. Id. at G-7 col. 1.
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THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE DISPUTE
During the controller "sick-out," the Government began legal action to
require either that the men return to work or present proof that they
were ill.1°2  The FAA through various federal district courts obtained
temporary restraining orders which were subsequently converted into pre-
liminary injunctions.103  Government legal action, although successful in
that it required the controllers to return to work, was not completely
successful in four major cities. In New York, Denver, and Chicago the
federal district courts gave the controllers return to work protection, in that
the FAA was prevented from taking any disciplinary action against the
men in those jurisdictions who were obeying the court orders and going
back to work. In Cleveland, though no opinion was written, the judge
orally warned the FAA that, if extensive disciplinary action were taken,
he would not hesitate to issue an order similar in terms to those of New
York, Denver, and Chicago.' 0 4
Government appeal followed the district court rulings in the Seventh,
Tenth and Second Circuits. In the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses
the city of Chicago, the United States Court of Appeals unanimously af-
firmed the district court's decision to restrain any FAA disciplinary action
until the case was decided on its merits. In the Second Circuit, which
encompassed the city of New York, the United States Court of Appeals,
reversing the district court, found that no ban on FAA disciplinary action
should be imposed. In a 2-1 decision the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, which encompasses the city of Denver, in the case
of United States v. Robert D. Moore, and in a companion case United
States v. Clinton H. Abnet affirmed the district court ruling.105 The
Circuit Court here reasoned that the order was that of a trial court in aid
of its jurisdiction. Therefore, the fact that the defendants had not ex-
hausted their administrative remedies did not prevent the court from
maintaining the status quo as of March 25, 1970, at least until the deter-
mination was made as to whether or not an illegal strike had existed. 106
Judge Breitenstein, in his dissent, stated, however that he was unaware of
any precedent which supported judicial action enjoining the executive
branch in an administrative matter.10 7  With this decision favoring the
102. Interview with Richard Bartsch, Attorney for PATCO Controllers in the
Chicago Area, in Chicago, Feb. 25, 1971.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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controllers' actions, they felt that a significant battle had been won in
their quest for effective representation.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE DISPUTE
Following the rather hollow victory won by the controllers, the situation
was deteriorating rapidly for PATCO and its membership. As of October,
1970, fifty-five controllers, virtually all of them PATCO officers, had
been fired from the service and hundreds of suspensions were levied.108
Even through and after the "alleged strike," PATCO, following the pro-
cedures of Executive Order 11491, applied for recognition but was chal-
lenged by NAGE, ATCA and the FAA; further, NAGE lodged an
unfair labor practice charge against PATCO. 109
To resolve both issues, the United State Department of Labor ap-
pointed Louis Libbin as Hearing Examiner. PATCO produced evidence
showing that a recent FAA report determined that NAGE represented
2,000, ATCA 2,150 and PATCO 7,100 of the non-supervisory journey-
man controllers.11 0
The FAA produced evidence indicating that PATCO had engaged in
an illegal strike. It showed: (a) PATCO on January twenty-fifth sent a
telegram to Secretary Volpe indicating that all optional sevices would
be terminated on February fifteenth and proposing a meeting; (b) Bailey
made a speech to PATCO western members on February second express-
ing the necessity for affirmative action; (c) Bailey said in his February
thirteenth press conference that he anticipated an impact on the system on
February fifteenth; (d) at a PATCO membership meeting on February
twenty-third a PATCO board member, Biava, told the members that the
reason that the proposed "sick-out" was not called on February fifteenth
was that PATCO had entered into talks with various heads of the FAA;
(e) PATCO telephoned messages to workers not to report on March
twenty-fifth; (f) PATCO issued a news release on March twenty-fourth
indicating that service would be severely diminished at eight o'clock on
March 25, 1970; (g) abnormal absenteeism (five times as high as the
norm began) on March 25, 1970; and (b) Bailey in his March twenty-
sixth press conference urged men to "walk-out" due to the danger to the
flying public caused by so few a number of controllers working.' The
108. Bartsch, supra note 102.
109. Government Employee Relation Report No. 370, Oct. 12, 1970, at G-1
col. 2.
110. See PATCO Newsletter, Aug. 13, 1969, at 1.




foregoing are representative of the facts upon which Examiner Libbin
based his decision. In total, the facts found by him consumed six pages
of the Labor Department Report. These facts presented a continuing
portrait of the controllers' guilt of strike activity.
After reviewing the facts before him, Examiner Libbin concluded:
I find, upon consideration of all the previously detailed evidence as a whole, that
P.A.T.C.O. called the controller's strike, assisted and participated therein during its
duration, and condoned it by failing to take affirmative action to preveni or stop
it .. .. 112
Further:
I find by these acts, considered singly and collectively, P.A.T.C.O. asserted the right
to strike against an agency of the United States Government, or to assist or par-
ticipate in such strike. . . . I therefore find that at least during that period
•P.A.T.C.O. was disqualified as a labor organization within the meaning of that Sec-
tion of the Order.113
Finally, Examiner Libbin stated:
As I have found that P.A.T.C.O. called the controller's strike, assisted and par-
ticipated therein, and condoned it by failing to take affirmative action to prevent
or stop it, I find that P.A.T.C.O. committed unfair labor practices. 114
The examiner had found against PATCO on all issues. He found con-
clusively that PATCO did strike and therefore was guilty of an unfair
labor practice.
In hearing Examiner Libbin's conclusion he recommended: (1) that
PATCO cease and desist from asserting the right to strike; (2) that
PATCO's application for recognition be witheld for a sixty day period;
and (3) that PATCO for sixty consecutive days post notice that they were
guilty of an unfair labor practice. 1 5 Clearly, responsibility for the strike
had been placed on PATCO.
Whatever the decision made on who caused the strike, there was little
doubt about which party had suffered the most damage. The controller
strike caused nearly $100,000,000 in damages to the airline industry.116
After the strike, the Airline Transportation Association (ATA), the air-
line industry's spokesman, instituted suit against PATCO for this
amount."17
112. Id. at G-9, col. 1.
113. Id. at G-9, col. 2.
114. id. at G-10, col. 1.
115. Id. at G-14, col. 1, 2.
116. See PATCO Newsletter, Sept. 14, 1970 at 1.
117. Id.
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THE NEW PATCO: CURRENT PROBLEMS-FUTURE OUTLOOK
Even as this suit was being filed and the Government was petitioning
for reconsideration of the disciplinary action it sought to take, PATCO
began an internal renovation in its hierarchy. F. Lee Bailey ceased active
participation in PATCO affairs. In a September 1970 newsletter, PATCO
told the membership:
Many mistakes were made over the past 2% years, along with the creation of
many good ideas. In the post-sick-out era P.A.T.C.O. made some major changes.
Not only in our posture, leadership, and organization but in our very outlook as
well. With the press we keep quiet. This in itself was a radical departure from our
past actions. We advertised "conciliation rather than confrontation." . . . The
field of labor relations and subtle persuasions have become the key in attempting to
get concrete results for the controller.' 1 8
PATCO had changed its outlook. It prepared to adopt a new approach.
The changes which PATCO began implementing went so far as to reach
the election of a new president and an affiliation with the Marine En-
gineers Benevolent Association (MEBA).119 During the PATCO-FAA
problem MEBA had been helpful to PATCO offering mediators and
$50,000 in loans to counteract the FAA cancellation of check-off priv-
ileges.' 20 Further, MEBA, with its long success in labor negotiations and
the respect it commanded in Washington D.C. would provide much
needed power in dealing with the FAA and Congess. Finally, MEBA,
because it has never asserted the right to strike, could do but good to
PATCO's new image. 1 2 1
With new leadership PATCO began new programs-one such program
was the initiation of talks with ATA. These meetings played a most im-
portant role in reaching a settlement that terminated the multi-million
dollar law suit previously filed against PATCO. 122  In that agreement
PATCO consented to the issuance of a permanent federal injunction
against work stoppages in consideration for the ATA dropping the suit.
The settlement helped the organization immeasurably. A statement ac-
companying it expressed a hope on each side that future relations be-
tween the two organizations would impove.
The new PATCO was still concerned with the Government's legal ac-
tion. In response to the Government's petition for reconsideration, appel-
late courts in the tenth and seventh Circuits, the last areas restraining
118. Id. at 2, col. 1.
119. See PATCO Newsletter, June 28, 1970, at 1, col. 1, at 3, col. 1.
120. Shaftic, supra note 39.
121. Shaftic, supra note 39.
122. See PATCO Newsletter, Sept. 14, 1970 at 1.
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FAA disciplinary action, reversed their earlier rulings, thus, leaving the
controllers unprotected from employment suspension and termination.
The courts indicated that the FAA was the proper forum to dispose of
agency problems.
Thus the courts of the United States have denied the controllers pro-
tection from the FAA sanction. PATCO, having to date been judicially
defeated is, at present, preparing its appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.123 The appeal will focus on the issue of whether United States
district courts have the discretion to restain an administrative agency's
disciplinary action as a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunc-
tion requiring the men to return to work.
While New York controllers, because this appeal is founded upon the
adverse decision of the Second Circuit, are not suffering from FAA dis-
ciplinary action, the rest of the system is feeling the effect. At Chicago
Center Control, for example, nearly one-hundred letters of suspension
have been sent to controllers and fifty more are expected. At O'Hare
International Airport fourteen have been sent and twelve more are ex-
pected. 124 To date PATCO has thus been unable to stop FAA action
even the three men at Baton Rouge over whom the strike began have been
fired.
While PATCO has, to date, lost its legal fight to protect the controllers
who struck, and has not yet been able to gain exclusive recognition to
represent controllers, there have been some successes, as exemplified by
its affiliation with MEBA and the settlement agreement with the ATA.
Also as a result of the successful FAA legal action, PATCO has lost
many of its more militant leaders. The stance of the organization has
changed accordingly. PATCO has become more cooperative with the
FAA as is evidenced by its relative inactivity and conciliatory posture
toward the ATA. An example of the latter circumstance is the "no-
strike" promise in the court settlement. In common parlance, PATCO
has, to some extent, "been taught a lesson."
PATCO's recent change of stance into a less vocal oganization, while
representing a somewhat genuine change of philosophy, may very well
be motivated, in part, by the position of the organization in the eyes of
the Labor Department. This conclusion reaches significant propotions
when viewed in the light of the decision reached on January 29, 1971,
by the Department concerning the findings of hearing examiner, Libbin,
123. Bartsch, supra note 102.
124. Interview with Richard Shaftic, Chairman of PATCO at O'Hare Tower,
in Chicago, Mar. 4, 1971.
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that PATCO had been found guilty of committing an unfair labor prac-
tice. 125 The Department of Labor's decision adopted the finding that
PATCO violated Executive Order 11491 by leading a controller strike
but modified Libbin's remedy. Instead of the sixty day period during
which PATCO's petition for national, exclusive recognition would be held
in abeyance, the period was made a sixty day minimum conditioned upon
PATCO's continued demonstration of compliance to the decision and
adherence to the provisions of the Executive Order in the future. PATCO
officials claimed they were elated over this modification. 1 26 They would
be ill advised to engage in any activity which would endanger a result
which they consider so favorable.
PATCO for the present, at least until the Labor Department decides
to forego further surveillance and issue a recognition order, will no doubt
remain quiet. Thereafter, the organization may very well return to its
more militant stand.
It is the opinion of this writer, however, that, influenced by the events
herein related, PATCO will show more professionalism in its organizational
affairs. It will not be led into a strike by "big-name" attorneys nor will
it air its grievances with the FAA in so devastating a manner. At this
point it is reasonable to believe that the PATCO which called the "sick-
out" of 1970 has died and probably shall never rise again. In its place a
new, "professional group of professionals" has risen and while it will be a
quieter group, it will still be concerned with the important issues raised
in those stormy days of early 1970.
THE PATCO DISPUTE IN THE LIGHT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES TO STRIKE
This chronicle of events leading to the controller "sick-out" is not an
isolated incident in public employment relations. The problems of em-
ployee-management relations, illustrated by the PATCO-FAA confronta-
tion, are important ones continually compounded by the increase of indi-
viduals holding government employment.
In 1969 there were twelve million public employees. This figure has
doubled since 1950 and it is estimated that by 1975 one out of every five
employees will work for the government. 1 27  These workers, as their
numbers grow, are organizing as PATCO did and are demanding a greater
125. See generally Government Employee Relation Report No. 387, Feb. 8, 1971.
126. Id.
127. See Note, Labor Law-Strikes By Public Employees-The Invalidity Of
The Prohibition, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1969).
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voice in employee-management relations. This growth in government
employees' numbers and interest has been manifested in almost a sixty per-
cent increase in union membership from 1956 to 1968, the year PATCO
was organized.' 28
While, generally, public employees, like air traffic controllers, do not
have the right to strike, work stoppages are on the increase. In 1950,
there were 28 government work stoppages; by 1966, the number had in-
creased to 142.129 In 1967, public employee work stoppages grew to
181.180
Federal Government labor legislation has expressly recognized the
right of private sector employees to strike.' 31 While no such general af-
firmation of the right to strike has been granted to employees in the public
sector, some states have begun passing governmental employee legislation.
In Minnesota, for example, disputes concerning maximum hours and
minimum wages of employees of charitable, non-profit hospitals, if a peti-
tion is made, must be submitted to arbitration.18 2 In Nebraska, arbitra-
tion for dispute settlement is allowed at the request of either party.'8 8 In
Pennsylvania, policemen and firemen or their public employer, after an
impass in collective bargaining has been reached, may seek arbitration. 34
Perhaps the most radical departure from the norm has occured in Hawaii,
where the right to strike has been granted to all public employees with
the only caveat being that the strike can be curtailed if it endangers
public safety.' 3 5 Hawaii's legislation further provides for "cool off" pe-
riods and mediation and arbitration procedures.
While in these few instances, some legislative action has been taken,
the right of public employees to strike, has almost uniformly been denied.
Two common reasons for this conclusion have been that the state is a
sovereign and a citizen-worker cannot deny its authority 13 and, that to
128. Zack, Why Public Employees Strike, 23 ARB. J. 69, 70 (1968).
129. Bloch, Public Employees Right To Strike, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 392
n.3 (1969).
130. Zack, Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, 14 N.Y.L. FoRuM 249,
251 (1968).
131. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 163 (1935).
132. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.38 (1966).
133. See NEBR. REV. STAT. § 48-824 (1968).
134. See 43 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (1968).
135. See Government Employee Relation Report No. 356, July 6, 1970, at B-13
wherein a discussion of the implementing Board is given. The statute was signed
into law on June 29, 1970.
136. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83 A.2d
482, 485 (1951) is a typical illustration.
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allow public employees to strike would inflict a great hardship on the
public at large. 137
Questions on these two justifications for the denial of the right to strike
come to light upon even casual observation. These questions yield de-
fects suggesting need for reevaluation. The denial of sovereignty rationale
does not correspond with reality. The history of strikes in the United States
indicates that they are principally motivated by economic and not political
considerations. "The sovereignty argument was originally proposed in a
political context. While strikes often have political overtones, their basic
motivation is economic."' 3  Certainly in our country the strike is an
economic grievance procedure not to be equated with a political denial
of sovereignty. One court has stated, in a suit for tort claims that, "[i]t
would seem somewhat anamolous that American courts should have
adopted the sovereign immunity theory in the first place since it was based
on the divine right of kings."' 39 It is difficult to believe that when con-
trollers, for example, strike, their thoughts stray from the improvement
of their jobs to the political sovereignty of the United States of America.
The other often quoted reason-the protection of the health and safety
of the public-has validity to a point, but it must differentiate between
those services against which strike activity would and those against which
strike activity would not result in public danger. While it is obvious that
a police or firemen's strike would endanger the public, can one make the
same claim of all other government employees?
To establish a logical and workable rule for labor-management dispute
settlement, a brief examination of the three types of settlement procedure
-unilateal employer decision, third. party intervention, and bargain and
negotiation between the parties-will be made.
In the public sector, unilateral employer decision has been the rule, as
has been exemplified by the FAA activity in its dispute with the air traffic
controllers. Evidence showing the increase of public union membership
and the number of work stoppages indicate the inadequacies of the present
system. The failure of the present system suggests the need for change.
The second procedure, third party intevention, has some inherent con-
stitutional limitations. Any third-party decision granting monetary in-
creases could run afoul of United States constitutional provisions granting
137. City of Manchester v. Manchester Teacher's Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131
A.2d 59 (1957) presents the rationale.
138. Supra note 129, at 399.




exclusive power of the control of money by the Congress. "Here the
question of a threatened taxpayers suit" arises based on the idea that such
action is "depriving the representatives and therefore the public of control
over the administration, and the funding of government."'
140
The third procedure is the allowance of bargain and negotiation tech-
niques between the parties. This procedure of necessity must include the
"right to strike"-labor's most potent weapon. It is the author's opinion
that under the "equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amendment,
public and private employees, without some rational basis, should not be
treated differently with respect to the right to strike. Thus, these workers
should be enabled to engage in strike activity in an effort to solve their
labor problems. Government vocations, not involving the health or safety
of the nation, provide no rational reason for denying such a right. While
public inconvenience would no doubt develop, this climate would generate,
in like manner, enough healthy political pressure to insure rapid strike
settlement.
Other governmental vocations, those involving the health and safety of
the nation, do provide a rational basis for the denial of the right to strike.
To such a vocation, like those of the air traffic controllers, other avenues
for dispute settlement must be made available. Clearly, unilateral em-
ployer decision-making has not proved successful in such cases.
CONCLUSION
Thus, in the final analysis, for those government employees engaged in
public health and safety related functions, new labor dispute settlement
techniques must be suggested. The right to strike cannot be allowed for
the welfare of the nation; unilateral employer decision has not prevented
strikes; and the problems illustrated in this comment were born from the
futility of the present system. The only feasible alternative is third party
intervention. Those employees who are not to be afforded the right to
strike should be allowed direct appeal to a congressional committee ar-
bitrator. Such a procedure would insure quick labor dispute settlement
without constitutional violation.
Since rapid labor dispute settlement must be the objective of all those
who advocate safe and efficient aviation development, and since aviation
development cannot continue successfully if the dangers and damages re-
sulting from the type of dispute described in this work are allowed to re-
occur, query, what does the future hold for management-labor relations
140. Supra note 130, at 265.
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at this level? The answer rests not in idealism or speculation, but simply
in the recognition that further delay in solving the problems causes but
additional problems to be solved.
James A. Calabrese
